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Abstract
High levels of inequality are a persistent feature of many rural areas in the
developing world. Rural inequality is correlated with major impediments of
rural development, such as crime, elite-capture, and lack of collective action.
Government transfer programs, such as conditional cash transfer, unemploy-
ment insurance, old-age pension or similar programs that target the lower
tail of a village’s cumulative welfare distribution function have become a very
popular public policy to tackle poverty and inequality in rural areas. While
the poverty impacts of those programs are well documented in the literature
less attention has been given to the redistributive capacity of such policies at
the village level. Among the main reasons for the neglect is a common belief
that monetary transfers to the lower tail of the village welfare distribution (i.e.
‘the poor’), while excluding the upper tail (i.e. ‘the rich’) from the program,
must lead to a reduction in inequality. In this paper we show that the impact
of such programs on reducing rural inequality may be lower than previously
thought. This is because program-eligible lower and program-ineligible upper
tail do not behave in isolation from each other. They are linked via inter-
actions in credit & insurance, as well as factor & commodity markets. If,
consequently, a government transfer triggers the lower tail to shift then the
upper tail follows, leading to modest reductions in local inequality.
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1 Introduction
High levels of inequality are a persistent feature of many rural areas, home of almost
80 percent of the world’s population. Using data from several pre-industrialized coun-
tries, Elbers et al. (2004) show that significant levels of inequality still exist even in the
poorest communities in rural areas. The literature emphasizes that a large proportion
of rural inequality may be explained by low levels of asset endowments (Zimmerman
and Carter, 2003), relatively high transaction costs such registration fees, titling and
information (Renkow et al., 2004), and lack of access to credit markets for the lower
tail of the rural welfare distribution ((De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000); Dercon (1998)).
The local level of inequality is correlated with major impediments of rural development,
such as crime (Kelly, 2000), elite-capture (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002); (Araujo
et al., 2008); Mansuri and Rao (2004)), targeting performance of anti-poverty programs
(Galasso and Ravallion, 2005), and lack of collective action (Dayton-Johnson and Bard-
han (2002);Chwe (1999)).1
Government transfer programs, such as conditional cash transfer, unemployment insur-
ance, old-age pension or similar programs targeting the lower tail of the rural welfare
cumulative distribution function are increasingly being implemented by governments to
reduce poverty and inequality in rural areas. The effects of such programs on poverty
have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature.2 Through increasing
household income, these programs are associated with a significant rise in household
consumption at the lower tail of the rural welfare distribution. Maybe it is this kind
of evidence that has prevented more research on the redistributive capacities of such
policies at the village level. The latter may seem to be a trivial exercise since the
program-induced consumption increase at the lower tail of a rural village’s welfare dis-
tribution should, ceteris paribus, lead to a reduction in inequality.
In this paper we contribute to the literature on the distributional impacts of public
policies (see Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006), Cunha et al. (2006), Bitler et al. (2006)
for some recent examples) by showing that the impact of such government transfer
programs on reducing rural inequality may be lower than previously thought. This is
because program-eligible lower and program-ineligible upper tail of the villages cumula-
tive welfare distribution function do not behave in isolation from each other. They are
linked via interactions in credit & insurance, as well as factor & commodity markets.
If, consequently, a government transfer triggers the lower tail to shift then the upper
tail follows, leading to modest reductions in local inequality.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the setup
for empirical analysis. We exploit the unique implementation design of a Mexican
government program to tease out the causal effect of the program on village inequality.
The latter turns out to be lower than expected. In an attempt to shed light on the
reason for this at a first glance surprising result section 3 then explores the existence of
linkages along the village welfare distribution. We show that interactions in credit &
insurance, as well as factor & commodity markets create a situation whereby monetary
government transfers granted to the lower tail of the village welfare distribution do
lead to welfare improvements at the program-ineligible upper tail. Finally, section 4
1See Mansuri and Rao (2004) for an overview of both theoretical and empirical literature.
2see Lindert et al. (2006) and Fizbein and Schady (2009) for a comprehensive overview.
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concludes.
2 Distributional Effects of Government Transfers at the Village
Level
2.1 The Setup for Empirical Analysis
We define inequality as a functional ν of the distribution of some outcome Y , ν : FY →
<. Some of the most frequently used inequality measures are3:
1. Gini Coefficient (GC):
νGG(FY ) = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
∫ νQτ (FY )
−∞ y · dFY (y)dτ∫
y · dFY (y) (1)
2. Coefficient of Variation (CV):
νCV (FY ) =
(
∫
(y − ∫ z · dFY (z))2 · dFY (y))1/2∫
y · dFY (y) (2)
Let FY (1) be the cdf of outcome y in some village j where a government transfer program
is available to households belonging to the lower tail of the village’s welfare cumulative
distribution function, and FY (0) denote the cdf of the same village had the program
not been present. The average effect of the program on village inequality, henceforth
the inequality treatment effect (AIE) is then given by the expression
AIE = E[νj(FY (1))|Pj = 1]− E[νj(FY (0))|Pj = 1]. (3)
The identification problem arises from the fact that we can only observe the level of
inequality of some village j in either the presence or the absence of the program, but
never in the two states at the same time. If assignment of villages to the program is
random then the expected level of inequality in program villages had the program not
been assigned to the village, equals the expected level of inequality in villages that have
not been assigned to the program. Formally,
E[νj(FY (0))|Pj = 1] = E[νj(FY (0))|Pj = 0]. (4)
The expression on the right hand side, thus, provides a valid counterfactual for the
expected level of inequality in program villages had the program not been implemented.
Substituting yields our estimator for the average village inequality treatment effect
ÂIE1 = E[νj(FY (1))|Pj = 1]− E[νj(FY (0))|Pj = 0] (5)
which is obtained by the following OLS regression
νj = α0 + θ1Pj + βZj + uj (6)
where θ1 is an estimator for the AIE, Zj is a vector of village controls in order to increase
the precision of the estimate, and uj denotes a random error.
3see Cowell (2000) for a recent survey of methods of inequality measurement
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Figure 1: The Experimental Design
2.2 The Data
In 1997, the Mexican government started the so called Progresa program with the aim of
reducing rural poverty and inequality (Schultz, 2004). The program provides monetary
grants to the lower tail of the village welfare distribution, i.e. the poorest households of
a village. In order to identify the latter, the Mexican government used a multidimen-
sional poverty index.4 Progresa monetary grants are of substantial size, amounting to
about 20 percent of average household income in rural Mexico.
For the purpose of impact evaluation and feasibility of program implementation, the
program was initially not implemented simultaneously in all villages. In 1997, the Mex-
ican government determined all eligible households. Then, a set of villages where the
program ought to be implemented first was chosen randomly. Households classified
as ‘poor’ in these villages would receive the first Progresa transfer payment in early
1998. The remaining villages would only be incorporated into the program two years
later. Households classified as ‘poor’ in these villages would receive the first Progresa
transfer only in early 2000. The latter, therefore, serve as a control group for the years
1998 and 1999. In some 320 villages where the program would be implemented first
(henceforth referred to as ‘treatment villages’) and in another 186 villages where the
program would start two years later (henceforth referred to as ‘control villages’) the
Mexican government conducted a comprehensive baseline, and a three follow-up surveys
between and 1998 and 1999. These surveys are village censuses whereby data on all
residents of these 506 villages was collected. We thus have a panel of the entire village
welfare cumulative distribution function, consisting of program-eligible households at
4see Skoufias et al. (2001) for a description of the method.
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the lower tail and program-ineligible households at the upper tail, in each of the 320
treatment and 186 control villages. Figure 1 shows the structure of the experimental
design. The experimental design of the program in combination with the census nature
of these surveys allows us to calculate and compare the level of inequality in treatment
versus control villages. Under random assignment of villages to the program, equation
6 identifies the impact of the program on village inequality.5
Prior to the start of the program these 506 villages have characteristics that would
describe many village economies across the globe. The average village size is 45 house-
holds, 95 percent of which report agriculture to be their main source of livelihood. One
year after the start of the program, on average 60 percent of residents in treatment
villages receive the government transfer. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of house-
holds classified eligible (i.e. ‘poor’) and households classified ineligible (i.e. ‘non-poor’)
by the government.6 The table suggests that the program was effective in targeting
the lower tail of the village welfare distribution, i.e. the poorest households of a vil-
lage. Program-eligible households have, on average lower food consumption, income and
education levels, as well as lower land and livestock holdings, compared to program-
ineligible households. These differences are all statistically significant.
Inequality is substantial these 506 villages. For example, the average village gini coef-
ficient for household income (plus value of consumed own agricultural production) is
0.44.
2.3 Results: Average Inequality Treatment Effects
The first column in table 2 shows the village inequality treatments effect using food con-
sumption as a proxy for household welfare. We cannot reject the null of zero reduction
in food consumption inequality in treatment villages. As a consistency check we also
consider income (plus the value of consumed own agricultural production) as outcome
variable. While we observe a small reduction of .038 in the coefficient of variation, we
cannot reject the null of no change in a village’s gini coefficient.
Why may a program that provides monetary grants to the lower tail of the village
welfare distribution have rather modest effects on reducing village inequality? Maybe
the program had no significant effect on outcomes of transfer recipients. We can rule
out this possibility by referring to Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) and Angelucci and
De Giorgi (2009) who found sizeable effects of the program on transfer recipient’s food
consumption and income levels. Consequently, in order to explain the modest program
effect on village inequality, it must be that welfare gains at the lower tail of village
welfare distribution do ‘spill-over’ to the program-ineligible upper tail.
In order to see what reductions in inequality we would expect in the absence of such
‘spillover’ we conduct a static microsimulation of the Progresa monetary transfer on
program-eligible households residing in control villages. The microsimulation proce-
5See for example Behrman and Todd (1999) who, for a vector of village characteristics, cannot reject the null of zero
mean difference between treatment and control villages at baseline .
6We present descriptive statistics of the control group, one year after the start of the program. Ideally, we would
present characteristics of all sample households in both treatment and control villages prior to the start of the program.
Unfortunately, key variables such as food consumption and income plus value of consumed own agricultural production
are not available in the baseline survey.
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Table 1: Characteristics of the Counterfactual Sample
Eligible Households Ineligible Households
Mean Mean
[Std.Dev.] [Std.Dev.]
Household and Community Characteristics
Gini Index for agricultural land ownership 0.71
[120.7] [124.9]
Pre-program household poverty score 701.6 882.5
[120.7] [124.9]
Monthly Food consumption (per capita, peso value) 182.5 198.4
[163.6] [153.2]
Monthly Food expenditure (per capita, peso value) 137.3 169.6
[130.1] [145.4]
Monthly non-purchased food consumption (per capita, peso value) 38.85 27.86
[591.9] [48.1]
Monthly household disposable income (in peso) 662.1 795.3
[362.6] [2129.8]
Cultivated area (in hectare) 0.46 0.75
[2.77] [2.31]
Hourly wage rate 5.27 6.97
[36.14] [25.12]
Livestock holding index -0.21 0.06
[2.41] [3.63]
Household size 5.44 4.82
[2.60] [2.53]
Indigenous household head 0.36 0.17
[0.48] [0.37]
Education of head
no 32.55 26.35
primary 62.03 64.52
secondary 4.92 6.95
tertiary 0.51 2.19
N 6857 1949
Notes: standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. Livestock index calculated using principal component analysis
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Table 2: Average inequality treatment effect for food consumption, two years after the start of the
program
(Household monthly food consumption (p.a.e) Household monthly income (plus VCOAP)
Observed AIE Simulated AIE Observed AIE Simulated AIE
θ1 θ2 θ1 θ2
Gini Coefficient -.006 -.015*** -.004 -.014*
[.004] [.004] [.007] [.008]
Coefficient of Variation -.007 -.029** -.038* -.046*
[.010] [.011] [.022] [.024]
n = 506 n = 372 n = 506 n = 372
Notes: *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
VCOAP stands for value of consumed own agricultural production, and p.a.e stands for ’per adult equivalent’.
dure is as follows:7 In a first step, we estimate the level of inequality in each control
village (186 villages). We call the vector of obtained measures group zero (G = 0).
In a second step, we add the Progresa monetary transfer to household income of each
program-eligible household in the control group, then determine the consequent change
in each eligible household’s food consumption and income plus value of consumed own
agricultural production, in order to finally recalculate inequality measures in each con-
trol village. We call the vector of obtained measures group one (G = 1). In a third step,
we calculate the simulated average inequality treatment effect on the control group as
ÂIE2 = E[νj|G = 1]− E[νj|G = 0]
= E[νj(FY (0)+τ )|Pj = 0]− E[νj(FY (0))|Pj = 0] (7)
where E[νj(FY (0))|Pj = 0] is the expected level of inequality in control villages without
the program, and E[νj(FY (0)+τ )|Pj = 0] is the expected level of inequality in the same
villages after adding the monetary transfer to eligible households residing in those
villages. The simulated average inequality effect is obtained by the following OLS
regression on control villages (Pj = 0):
νj = α0 + θ2Gj + βZj + uj ∀ j ∈ Pj = 0 (8)
where θ2 is an estimator of the AIE in the absence of ‘spillover’ from the program-
eligible lower to the program-ineligible upper tail of a village’s welfare distribution. Zj
is a vector of village controls in order to increase the precision of the estimate, and uj
denotes a random error.
The second and fourth column in table 2 show the results of the microsimulation. The
simulated average inequality treatment effect for food consumption is higher than the
observed inequality treatment effect. For the gini coefficient, for example, we estimate a
reduction of .015, while the observed reduction is .006. The simulated reduction in the
coefficient of variation is .029. while the observed reduction is .011. A similar pattern
holds when considering income (plus the value of consumed own agricultural produc-
tion) as outcome variable. The simulated reduction in inequality as measured by the
gini coefficient is .014, compared to an observed reduction of .004. The simulated re-
duction in the coefficient of variation is .046, compared to an observed reduction of .038.
7We refer the reader to the appendix for more details on the microsimulation.
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Figure 2 visualizes the effect of the program on the entire food consumption cumula-
tive distribution function (cdf). Plotted are the cdf of household food consumption
(monthly, per capita) in treatment (320 villages), control (186 villages), and simulated
villages (186 villages), respectively. The upper graph shows the lower tail of the cdf.
The monetary transfer induces the cdf to shift to the right, i.e. program participants
consume more food. The simulated cdf predicts almost exactly the observed cdf. As
one moves upwards the distribution, however, the simulated cdf converges with the
‘no-program’ cdf. This is because the number of eligible households converges towards
zero as one moves upward in the distribution. However, even through the number of
program-eligible (i.e. ‘poor’) households converges towards zero as one moves upward
the distribution, the observed effect on food consumption stays roughly constant, sug-
gesting that program-ineligible households (i.e. the ‘non-poor’) do also increase food
consumption, even through they do not receive the government monetary transfer. In-
deed, when comparing the level of monthly per capita household food consumption of
program-ineligble households in treatment versus control villages we find the former
to be 20 peso higher than the latter.8 The fact that both lower and upper tail of the
distribution shift to the right then explains why we observe no reduction in inequality
in program villages.9
Why does the upper tail follow the lower tail, although the latter receives the bulk
of the government transfer? In the following we’ll explore linkages along the rural
welfare distribution. Program-eligible lower tail and program-ineligible upper tail do
not behave in isolation from each other. They are linked via interactions in credit &
insurance, as well as factor & commodity markets. If, consequently, the lower tail of the
outcome distribution shifts as a consequence of the transfer program, then the upper
tail does follow.
3 Linkages Along the Village Welfare Distribution
3.1 Credit & Insurance Market Linkages
In many agrarian village economies, households are subject to a number of potential
consumption shocks.10 Climatic risks (drought, flooding, frost, etc.) and associated
harvest failure, but also labour and oxen problems (diseases, deaths), as well as land
problems (villagisation, land reform) are some of the frequent risks these households
are facing (Dercon, 2002).11 Yet, despite the apparent need of households to smooth
income fluctuations, formal financial and insurance markets for even the most prevalent
risks are often deficient. That is why informal insurance arrangements are particularly
prevalent. The literature on informal risk insurance stresses that informal in-kind gifts
to other community members, based on the principle of reciprocity, is among the most
common informal insurance strategies (Fafchamps, 1992). The simplest form of reci-
procity is a norm of sharing and gifting (Cashdan, 1985). The gift recipient is often
8Our result are consistent with the findings of Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009).
9We do find a similar pattern when considering income (plus value of consumed own agricultural production) as
outcome variable (see figure 3 in the appendix).
10Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), Pallage and Robe (2003), Grimard (1997)
11High income variability related to risks of various forms have been investigated by Townsend (1994) for India using
the 10-year panel data for one of three ICRISAT villages in India. He finds high yearly fluctuations yields (in monetary
terms) per unit of land for the dominant crops. Kinsey et al. (1998) analyze the frequency of harvest failures in a 23-year
panel of rural households in a resettlement area in Zimbabwe and find high fluctuations. Dercon (2002)and Morduch
(1995) provide more examples.
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Figure 2: Cumulative Distribution Functions
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not expected to give back something equivalent to what is received, but rather to help
whenever the donor is in need.
Rosenzweig (1988) suggests that such informal insurance arrangements operate along
the village welfare distribution. He argues that income streams of involved parties must
differ in order to make informal reciprocity insurance arrangements an optimal strat-
egy for both parties involved. Because if the insurance parties would come from the
same point at the village welfare distribution, i.e have identical income streams, then
neither party would be able to smooth the others consumption when a covariate shock
(for example harvest failure) hits. Both parties are always equally affected and hence
unable to help smoothing the other’s consumption stream. It is therefore optimal for
households to seek informal insurance arrangements with households that are located
at a different position in the village income distribution. This implies that the lower
tail of the village welfare distribution reallocates a part of the government monetary
transfer to the upper tail of the village welfare distribution.
Taking the example of the Mexican Progresa program, Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009)
explore such credit and insurance markets linkages between lower and upper tail. Their
findings imply that the lower tail of the village welfare distribution reallocates part of
the transfer to the upper tail in form of credit and/or gifts. The authors further ar-
gue that this increased availability of insurance for the upper tail induces the latter to
consume now redundant precautionary in-kind savings. The latter leads to permanent
increases in food consumption levels.
3.2 Commodity Market Linkages
Apart from linkages in credit and insurance markets, we’ll in the following bring sugges-
tive evidence that linkages in commodity markets are equally important in explaining
why the program-ineligible upper tail of the village welfare distribution does follow the
transfer-receiving lower tail: government transfers granted to the lower tail increases
the latter’s demand for both agricultural and non-agricultural commodities. Due to
production-capacity constraints of the village a large proportion of the demand in-
crease is met through village imports. The program-ineligble upper tail of the village
welfare distribution, in turn, accrues additional income from supplying these commodi-
ties to the lower tail.
Increase in Village Imports
The average village size in our sample of 506 survey villages is 45 households. On aver-
age 60 percent households in village are classified as ‘poor’ by the Mexican government
and hence do qualify for the transfer program. Lehmann (2010) reports that, one year
after the start of the program, monthly per capita household food consumption for a
household residing in a treatment village is, on average, 19 Peso higher compared to
control villages. In order to see how much of the latter is met through village imports
Lehmann (2010) calculates for each of the 506 villages of the sample, the difference
between the sum of village resident’s food purchases and sales of resident’s own agri-
cultural production. Lehmann then regresses this difference on the treatment status of
a village. The result is a lower bound estimate of the program effect on village food
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Table 3: OLS Regression on pre-program asset index: Dependent variable is Pr[selling retail commodi-
ties] and profits from sales of retail commodities (in Mexican Peso), respectively.
Pr[selling retail commodities] Profits [retail commodities]
OLS Probit OLS Tobit
Pre-Program Asset Index .005*** .039*** 24.91* 177.49***
[.002] [.014] [13.58] [40.39]
Controls YES YES YES YES
n 19,989 19,989 19,989 19989
Notes: *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the village
level. The wealth index is the first principal component of a vector of household durables (car, material of floor,
etc.) measured prior to the start of the program.
imports.12 Lehmann’s findings suggest that fourteen out of the 19 Peso increase in food
consumption is met by village food imports.
Imports are not limited to only food. In table 5 in the appendix we report increases
in consumption of other goods that are usually not produced by the village. The ta-
ble shows that households spent a significant proportion of the government transfer on
household supplies (pans etc.), shoes and clothing, as well as toys and school supplies
for children.
Income Increase from Sales of Imported Products
The import process is a linkage function between the lower and upper tail of the village
welfare distribution. The program-ineligible upper tail may benefit through appropri-
ating value-added from the import process.
How does the import process looks like in Mexican villages? Field visits by the author
to around 30 rural villages in February 2010 revealed that village imports are mainly
sourced from the state capital. The costs of reaching the state capital are usually sub-
stantial for a household belonging to the lower tail of the village welfare distribution.
That is why a product is usually not imported by the end-consumer but rather by some
village resident who acts as intermediary. This ‘retail seller’ purchases a certain amount
of a product in the state capital and sells it with a mark-up in the village.
Who engages in such kind of commercial import activities, the upper or the lower tail of
the village welfare distribution? Let Irei take the value one if a household sells products
that neither stem from its own agricultural production nor were manufactured by the
household. We will refer to this type of commodities as ‘retail commodities’. Let Y rei be
in the profits derived from sales of such commodities. In Table 3 we report the results
of regressing Irei and Y rei on a pre-program household wealth index13 and a vector of
controls, respectively. Our results suggest that a household located at the upper tail
of the village wealth distribution is a) more likely to sell ‘retail commodities’ and b)
derives higher profit from such sales.
Consequently, we’d expect the upper tail of the village welfare distribution to accrue ad-
12The estimate is a lower bound estimate because villagers can also realize sales of own agricultural production outside
the village (exports). The higher the amount of village food exports, the more we are underestimating the program
effect on village food imports.
13The wealth index is the first principal component of a vector of household durables (car, material of floor, etc.).
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Table 4: OLS Regression results: Changes in retail business activity of non-beneficiaries in treatment
villages
profits Pr[selling retail products] work hours/day work days/month
Tobit OLS Tobit Tobit
Residing in treatment village 83.12* .019** 1.48* 7.24**
[47.84] [.008] [.86] [3.02]
Controls YES YES YES YES
n 4,630 4,515 4,495 4,495
Notes: *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Only program-ineligible households are included in the regression.
ditional income from the program induced raise in demand for imported commodities.
Table 4 reports the difference in profits from sales of ‘retail commodities’ of program-
ineligible households (i.e. located at the upper tail of the village welfare distribution)
in treatment versus control villages. We find that ineligible households in treatment
villages make 83.12 Peso/month more profit. This is roughly seven percent of the av-
erage household income of program-ineligible households. Table 4 further shows that
program-ineligible households allocate more labor to selling retail products. On aver-
age, ineligible households in treatment villages work 11
2
hours more per day, and about
seven days more per month to such selling activities.
4 Conclusion
High levels of inequality are a persistent feature of many rural areas in the developing
world. Inequality is correlated with major impediments of rural development, such as
crime, elite-capture, and lack of collective action. Government transfer programs, such
as conditional cash transfer, unemployment insurance, old-age pension or similar pro-
grams that target the lower tail of a village’s welfare distribution have become a very
popular public policy to tackle poverty and inequality in rural areas. While the poverty
impacts of those programs are well documented in the literature less attention has been
given to the redistributive capacity of such policies at the village level. Among the main
reasons for the neglect is a common belief that monetary transfers to the lower tail of
the village welfare distribution (i.e. ‘the poor’), while excluding the upper tail (i.e. ‘the
non-poor’) from the program, must lead to a reduction in inequality. In this paper we
showed that the impact of such programs on reducing rural inequality may be lower
than previously thought. This is because program-eligible lower and program-ineligible
upper tail do not behave in isolation from each other. They are linked via interactions
in credit & insurance, as well as factor & commodity markets. Taking the example of
a Mexican transfer program, we bring suggestive evidence for linkages in the commod-
ity market. The transfer program leads to increased village imports. The ‘better-off’
households in the village, i.e. the program-ineligible upper tail of the village welfare
distribution, have the necessary asset endowments to engage in such import/retail trade
activities. The upper tail benefit‘s by deriving more income from sales of products that
do neither stem from own agricultural production nor are manufactured by the house-
hold.
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Our results imply that government transfer policies in village economies do have local
multiplier effects. The gains of these multiplier effects seem to be accrued by the upper
tail of the village welfare distribution.
From a public policy evaluation perspective, our results imply that impact evaluations
which disregard linkages between the program-eligible lower and program-ineligible up-
per tail may underestimate the overall impact of the program on poverty. This is
because in many cases funding for a transfer program is limited. Therefore, govern-
ments oftentimes allocate the transfer to the most vulnerable subset of the population,
i.e. the very lower tail of the village cumulative welfare distribution function. However,
those deemed ‘ineligible’ for the program oftentimes are far from what one would con-
sider ‘well-off’. For example, the monetary value of ineligibles’ daily per capita food
consumption in Mexico’s Progresa program was below one US Dollar when the program
started in 1997. Thus, poverty often persists even among the program-ineligible upper
tail of the village welfare cumulative distribution function. In the presence of credit &
insurance, as well as factor & commodity markets linkages between lower and upper tail
of the distribution, an evaluation that focuses exclusively on the part of the distribution
that has been granted the government transfer may underestimate the overall program
impact on village poverty.
Our results further imply that static microsimulations (see for example Bourguignon
and Spadaro (2006)) may yield inaccurate predictions of distributional impacts of gov-
ernment transfer programs in rural areas. Incorporating interactions of program-eligible
lower and program-ineligible upper tail via credit & insurance, as well as factor & com-
modity markets into a microsimulation frameworks remains thus a fruitful avenue for
future research.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Microsimulation
In a first step, we estimate inequality measures for food consumption in each control
village. In a second step, we add the monetary transfer to household income of each
eligible household in the control group, then estimate the change in food consumption
based on the elasticity of food consumption with respect to income, and finally calculate
again inequality measures for food consumption in each control village. In a third step,
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we calculate the difference between the inequality measures obtained in step one and
step two. In the following, we will describe these steps in more detail
Step 1: Inequality in control villages, before the monetary transfer
Let j be index for villages in the sample. In a first step, we obtain an estimate for
the level of inequality in control village, denoted νj(FY (0))|Pj = 0], using the inequality
measures defined in equations 2 to 1.
Step 2: Inequality in control villages, after introducing the monetary transfer
Since the cash transfer depends on the schooling choice of the household (i.e. the
more household members enrolled the higher the monetary transfer), we first have to
estimate the change in a household’s schooling choice when facing the opportunity of the
monetary transfer. This allows us to determine the magnitude of the monetary transfer
for each program-eligible household in the control group. We follow Bourguignon et al.
(2003) and model the enrollment choice of household in a multinomial logit framework
whereby Si is a qualitative variable that takes the value zero if the child works full-time,
one if the child works goes to school and works outside the household, and two if the
school attends school and does not work outside the household. The household chooses
Si = k if Vk[x′i, h
′
i, Y−i + yik(wi)] + νik > Vj[x
′
i, h
′
i, Y−i + yij(wi)] + νij for j 6= k (9)
where Vj is a latent function describing the household’s utility when choosing alter-
native j ∈ 1, 2, 3, and x′i and h′i being a vector of child and household characteristics,
respectively. Y−i is household income without the child’s contribution, yij is assumed
to be the child’s output of both market and domestic child labor in occupational choice
j as a function of the child’s market earnings wi, and νij being a random variable that
captures unobserved heterogeneity. The latent function Vj is assumed to be linear in
its component x′i,h′i, and Y−i + yij(wi):
Ui(j) = Vj[x
′
i, h
′
i, Y−i + yij(wi)] + νij = z
′
iγj + [Y−j + yij(wi)]αj + νij (10)
The potential child earnings are imputed as
log wi = x
′
iδ +m · ρI[Si = 1] + εi (11)
where x′i is a vector of child characteristics (age, schooling, etc.) and εi being a random
term capturing unobserved earning determinants. I[·] is an indicator function that takes
the value one if the child goes to school and works outside the household. The child’s
contribution to household income for the three occupational states is then defined as
yi0 = Kwi; yi1 = Myi0; yi2 = Dyi0 with M = exp ρ (12)
with yij assumed to measure the output of both market and domestic child labor. Hence,
domestic child labor income is proportional to actual or potential market earnings wi
in a proportion K for people that do not attend attend school. Going to school while
working outside the household reduces the child’s contribution by (1-M) percent, com-
pared to a non-enrolled child. Going to school without working outside the household
reduces the child’s contribution by (1-D) percent, compared to a non-enrolled child.
The proportions K and D are not observed. The proportion M is taken to be the
same for domestic and market work and may be estimated based on the child’s earning
equation. Substituting yields
Ui(j) = Vj[x
′
i, h
′
i, Y−i + yij(wi)] + νij = z
′
iγj + Y−jαj + βj wi + νij (13)
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with β0 = α0K, β1 = α1M K, and β2 = α2DK. Now, the monetary transfer would
effect household utility in the following way:
Ui(j) = z
′
iγj + (Y−j + τ
nut
i + τ
school
ij )αj + βj wi + νij (14)
where τnuti is the component of the monetary transfer that is independent of the school-
ing choice, and τ schoolij the component that depends on a household’s schooling choice.
Program eligible is defined by a household’s level of household welfare, denoted Φi. If
the household’s welfare is above the programs eligibility cut-off, Φi, then the household
is not eligible for any of the two monetary transfer components:
τnuti = τ
school
ij = 0 if Φi > Φi (15)
If the household’s welfare is below the cut-off, the it receives a nutrition monetary
transfer with value x ∈ Rn+,
τnuti ∈ Rn+ if Φi ≤ Φi (16)
and a schooling monetary transfer that depends on the enrollment choice
τ schooli
{
∈ Rn+ if j = 2, 3,Φi ≤ Φi
0 if j = 1,Φi ≤ Φi
(17)
with the exact value of the schooling component on gender, and grade of enrolled mem-
bers of eligible households. The household then chooses the alternative that maximizes
household utility:
k∗i = arg max[Ui(j)] (18)
We refer the reader to Bourguignon et al. (2003) for a description of the multinomial
logit simulation procedure that yields the optimal schooling choice k∗i of the household i.
Having obtained an estimate of the schooling choice of the eligible households, we are
then able to calculate the amount of the monetary transfer for each eligible household
i:
τi = τ
nut
i + τ
school
i (k
∗
i ) (19)
Having obtained the transfer amount, τi, we are then able to simulate the effect of the
monetary transfer on food consumption. Our reduced form model for food consumption
is
ci = α0 + α1yi + x
′
iβ + i (20)
where ci is monthly per capita food consumption (monetary value) of household i. The
variable yi denotes household income, and x′i is a vector of household characteristics.
We estimate the this equation with OLS to obtain estimates of α0, α1, β and i. We
then add the monetary transfer to household income and predict the new value of food
consumption by
cˆi = αˆ0 + αˆ1(yi + τi) + x
′
iβˆ + ˆi (21)
Step 3: The simulated average inequality treatment effect in the absence of ‘spill-over’
effects
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We then obtain an estimate for the level of inequality in control village after the mon-
etary transfer τ , denoted νj(FY (0)+τ )|D = 0], using the inequality measures defined in
equations 2 and 1.
ÂIE2 = E[νj(FY (0))|Pj = 0]− E[νj(FY (0)+τ )|Pj = 0] (22)
which is obtained by the following OLS regression on control villages (Dj = 0):
νj = α0 + θ2tj + βz
′
j + uj , if Dj = 0 (23)
where t is a dummy taking the value one for νj(FY (0))|Pj = 0 (i.e. before the monetary
transfer), and zero for νj(FY (0)+τ )|Pj = 0] (i.e. after the monetary transfer). θ2 is an
estimator of the AIE in the absence of ‘spill-over’ on the program-ineligible upper tail
of the village welfare distribution.
5.2 Tables
Table 5: Program effects on transfer recipient households (log) expenditures for non-food items (esti-
mated one year after the start of the program).
Treatment-Control
[se]
Hygiene .085***
[ .042 ]
Household utilities supplies .222***
[ .044 ]
Toys .102***
[ .022 ]
Cloth .610***
[ .090 ]
Shoes .557***
[ .089 ]
School supplies 0.275***
[ 0.047 ]
Notes: *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. We drop the 99 percentile of each variable.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Figure 3: Cumulative Distribution Function
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